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Abstract: This paper analyses the importance attached to the past behaviour of
the exchange rate when forming expectations and tests for the uncovered interest
parity hypothesis. Using interest rate dierentials for Uruguay over 1980-2010,
we identify a strong and time-varying extrapolative component in exchange rate
expectations. Agents attach more importance to the past behaviour of exchange
rates the higher the level of in
ation is. Yet agents are able to internalise policy
announcements and external events that are likely to aect exchange rate fun-
damentals. Further, we nd deviations from the uncovered interest parity hy-
pothesis. These are lower than those usually reported for developed economies.
Also, they tend to be higher for the period of low in
ation and freely 
oating
exchange rates. As long as what it takes to predict well is rather simple | i.e.
look backwards, follow policy announcements, the interest rate dierential per-
forms well. Once the exchange rate determination model becomes more intricate
or less familiar to the agents, they tend to fail at predicting exchange rate depre-
ciations. These results point to expectational failures as a likely explanation for
the `uncovered interest parity puzzle'.
JEL Classication: F31, G14
Key Words: Exchange rates, Uncovered interest parity, Expectations, Emerging
Economies, Bias, Puzzle1 Introduction
The uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIP) implies the domestic cur-
rency is expected to depreciate when domestic nominal interest rates exceed for-
eign interest rates. However, empirical evidence since the seminal work of Fama
(1984) has often found the opposite: the currency of the country with the re-
latively higher interest rate tends to appreciate. This is commonly known in
the literature as the `forward premium puzzle', or the uncovered interest parity
puzzle. This puzzle has triggered signicant research on the mechanisms under-
lying expectations formation, with the seminal contribution of Frankel and Froot
(1987).
Two regularities in the extant literature motivate this paper. First, that most
of the tests done on the deviations from the interest parity and on expectations
formation mechanisms have been applied to major currencies and developed eco-
nomies.1 Second, that most of the tests done on expectations generating mech-
anisms implicitly assume time stability. An exception in the literature is the
work done by Prat and Uctum (2007), who use a switching-regression framework
with stochastic choice of regime for a set of European currencies to nd that
expectation processes change gradually and smoothly over time.
The scant interest in the case of emerging economies, and in the evolution
of expectation generating mechanisms is surprising. Exploring determinants of
expectations formation and testing for UIP in the context of emerging economies
is particularly interesting for these economies which typically display two dis-
tinctive features: they evolve from high in
ation to low in
ation levels, and they
undergo changes in exchange rate policies.
Our contribution in this paper is twofold. First, we test and identify a time-
variant exchange rate expectations formation mechanism in the context of Ur-
uguay over the period 1980-2010, and second, we test the UIP across dierent
exchange rate regimes. Uruguay provides an interesting and representative case,
since it is a small, open and highly dollarized economy in which agents are fa-
miliar with the use of nancial instruments denominated in both domestic and
foreign currency. During this period it went from high to low in
ation levels, as
well as dierent exchange rate regimes: a period of short-lived and non-credible
stabilization plans with the exchange rate as a nominal anchor (Pre-TZ), a period
of credible target zones for the exchange rate (TZ), and a subsequent period in
which the Central Bank had no target for the exchange rate, and this was largely
determined by market forces (Post-TZ).
We present new evidence suggesting the extrapolative component in expecta-
tions formation mechanisms has been substantial on average, and it has changed
over time. By \extrapolative component" we mean the portion of yesterday's de-
preciation that is expected to occur today. Furthermore, we nd that apart from
an extrapolative component, agents display also adaptive and regressive compon-
ents in expectation formation, and also internalise the potential eects of policy
announcements on the path of exchange rates. In addition, we present evidence
of deviations from the UIP, although these are relatively small compared to those
typically reported in the literature. The size of the deviations from the UIP is
larger when looking at sub-periods than when looking at the whole period, which
1The few exceptions that compare the size of the deviations from the parity for developed
and developing countries are Bansal and Dahlquist (2000), and Frankel and Poonawala (2010),
while Gilmore and Hayashi (2008) focuses on emerging economies only.
2points to the importance of the `peso problem' in our data. Across sub-periods,
the largest deviations are found during the last period of freely 
oating exchange
rates, in which the economy experienced low in
ation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
links between depreciation expectations and interest rate dierentials. Section
3 introduces the research questions, and denes a number of key concepts to be
used in this paper. Section 4 presents the analysis of the determinants of exchange
rate expectations. Section 5 explores the tests on the uncovered interest parity.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
32 Depreciation Expectations and Interest Rate
Dierentials
To explore the exchange rate expectation generating mechanism one should
ideally use forecast data gathered in surveys of participants in the foreign ex-
change market. Unfortunately, these data are not available for Uruguay for the
period under consideration. Inevitably, we have to use an indirect measure of
expectations equal to the interest rate dierentials obtained from the uncovered
interest parity hypothesis.2
The hypothesis of uncovered interest parity states that as long as portfolio
investors are risk-neutral and have the choice of holding bonds denominated in
domestic (pesos) or foreign currency (dollars), with same default risk and no
dierences in transaction costs, then the following condition is veried:
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t;dc is the interest on a peso-bond at time t of maturity k-months, ik
fc is the
interest on a comparable dollar asset, s is the nominal exchange rate expressed
as pesos per dollar, se
t+k is the expected exchange rate for period t + k, t is the
time period in months. Then, the expected depreciation rate for the domestic
currency will be equal to (1 + idc)=(1 + ifc)   1. If agents are risk-averse, a risk
premium is added to the right hand side of equation (1). For the same expected
return, the holder of the risky asset will require an extra compensation.
During the period of analysis (1980-2010) agents in Uruguay have been allowed
to buy or sell assets denominated in foreign currencies without any restrictions.
Moreover, the banking system faced symmetric regulation for their peso and
dollar borrowing. In fact, all banks in the market oered deposits both in pesos
and in dollars, which meant that when the agent faced the decision of choosing
between the two assets, there were no dierences in transaction costs or risk of
default. Masoller (1997) argues that the use of interest rate dierentials as a proxy
for depreciation expectations at the beginning of the 1980s may be problematic
due to frictions in the banking system (mainly related to a small number of
players). However, we argue that the size of the domestic banking system should
not necessarily be taken as suggestive of a lack of competition, since the capital
account was fully liberalized in 1978, and restrictions to capital mobility were
eliminated. Thus, in the current paper we use the interest rate dierential as an
indicator of expected depreciation of the peso against the dollar.
3 Some Denitions & Research Questions
Given the aforementioned, in what follows, the paper uses interest rate dif-
ferentials for Uruguay over 1980m2   2010m3 and attempts to answer a number
of research questions listed below. For the sake of precision, before outlining the
research questions, we make explicit the way in which some key terms will be
understood in the analysis that follows.
2A survey on exchange rate expectations has only been carried out since 2006 by the Central
Bank of Uruguay. Also, given the absence of forward markets in Uruguay for most of the period
of analysis, we cannot use data on the forward premium.
4Backward-looking or Extrapolative expectations An agent forming ex-
pectations in a \backward-looking" or \extrapolative" manner will be understood,
here, as one that uses an autoregressive forecast model for exchange rate depre-
ciations. \Backward-looking expectations" and \extrapolative expectations" will
be used interchangeably.3
Backward-looking or extrapolative component in expectations: This
will be understood as the portion of the past depreciation that is extrapolated into
the future. That is, the portion of the depreciation that took place in period t 1,
that agents expect to occur again in period t.\ Backward-looking component" and
\degree of extrapolation" will be used interchangeably.
Intelligent expectations We will say that agents form \intelligent expecta-
tions" when their expectations about the relevant variable (depreciation) are not
only shaped by its past behaviour, but by the evolution of relevant indicators that
are bound to aect depreciation. This may imply, for instance, the internalization
of policy announcement, or the eects of shocks to the exchange rate market.
The research questions to be addressed in this paper are the following:
(RQ1) To what extent do agents extrapolate past trends when forming expecta-
tions about nominal depreciations of the exchange rate?
(RQ2) To what extent agents behave dierently in tranquil and crisis periods?
(RQ3) To what extent are they \intelligent" in forming expectations, that is,
internalizing policy or environmental changes?
(RQ4) Has the extrapolative component changed over time?
(RQ5) Has the interest rate dierential been a good predictor of exchange rate
movements?
3Of course, strictly, the term \backward-looking", when referring to expectations, only sug-
gests that agents look to the past in order to form expectations about the future. But they
may look at the evolution of any variable.
54 Expectation Generating Mechanisms: How much
do we extrapolate?
In this section we address Research Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4. We test whether
agents have formed expectations by extrapolating past trends in Uruguay over
the period 1980-2010, and how the degree of extrapolation changed over time.
It is argued that agents in currency markets adopt extrapolative or bandwagon
forecasting methods, by simply extrapolating the changes in previous periods
into future changes in the same direction. Looking at low-in
ation, developed
economies, the existing literature nds evidence on extrapolative expectations
for short horizons only (up to 1 month), while there is a twist in the mechanism
when looking at longer horizons, and agents seem to expect a reversion of the
previous exchange rate movement (see, for example, Frankel and Froot (1987),
MacDonald and Torrance (1988), Cavaglia et al. (1993) and Chinn and Frankel
(1994)).
The focus on Uruguay oers an interesting and representative case study of
an emerging economy. During the period of analysis the Uruguayan economy
experienced periods of high and low in
ation. Consumer Price In
ation reached
a maximum of 110% in 1990, then decreased to single digits after 1998. In
addition, the economy had dierent exchange rate regimes. From 1980 until 1992
(Pre-TZ), a number of short-lived regimes were in place. In March 1991, the
Central Bank introduced a price stabilization plan with the exchange rate as a
nominal anchor. The most visible element of this plan was a target zone (TZ)
for the nominal exchange rate. It was not until June 1992 that the amplitude
and the slope of the TZ was publicly announced. The regime was abandoned
in June 2002, in the middle of a deep recession, a banking crisis and after the
drastic depreciations in Brazil (1999) and Argentina (2002). In our analysis, we
dene the TZ regime as starting in 1993 to allow six months of `learning' after
the public announcement of the width and slope of the bands within which the
Central Bank was targeting the exchange rate to 
uctuate.4 A third regime (Post-
TZ) started after the abandonment of the target zones in 2002. Since 2003, the
Central Bank has not had any explicit target for the exchange rate. It would be
wrong, however, to dene this regime as a freely 
oating one, since it is possible
to identify Central Bank interventions during this period. However, these have
not been systematic, and it was argued by the authorities that their rationale
was to decrease the volatility, rather than to aect the level of the exchange rate.
These changes in the economic environment are likely to have impacted the way
agents formed expectations.
To assist clarity, Figure 1 displays a timeline in which the three sub-periods
are located as well as the major external events and dierent policy announce-
ments that may have aected expectations. Figure 2 plots the time pattern of
depreciation and interest rate dierentials, as a proxy for expected depreciation,
and shows the depreciation threshold that will be used for the denition of `tran-
quil' periods and `turbulent' periods. Turbulent periods will be considered to
4The TZ regime has been considered as credible during most of its duration. The credibility
of the TZ regime at an early stage has been argued rst by Bergara and Licandro (1994), and
later by Polgar (2002). Masoller (1997) compares the credibility of a stabilization plan in the
early 1980s with the TZ regime and concludes that the latter was substantially more credible
than the former.
6be those immediately after a `jump' in the exchange rate has happened. This
presents prima facie evidence of some degree of an extrapolative component in
expectations, as these seem to lag depreciation.
Figure 1: Regimes and Major External Events hitting the Uruguayan Economy
Firstly, we test the contribution of an extrapolative component in expectations
as well as the importance of a number of exogenous environmental variables.
For these purposes, we estimate a modied version of Frankel and Froot (1987),
in which investors' expected depreciation rate for the following six months is a
function of the depreciation over the last six months, of extreme movements in
the exchange rate, and of policy and other changes in the economic environment
as in equation (2).
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1st + 2Jumpt + 3Jumpt  st + X
0




0 if st  50%;
1 if st > 50%: (3)
se
t+6 is what agents expect at time t the exchange to depreciate in the follow-
ing six months and st is the observed depreciation at time t over the past six
months.5 `Jump' is included to allow for extreme events to have a direct eect on
expectations (through 2). The interaction of `Jump' and s is included to allow
for a dierential eect of s on expectations after an extreme event has taken
place (through 3).6 X is a matrix of variables capturing events aecting the
5We use depreciation and devaluation interchangeably.
6 During the period, there have been 15 episodes of depreciations of at least 50% in a 6-
month period. The `extreme' event was arbitrarily dened as a depreciation above 50% in
a 6-month period. The threshold was chosen by identifying the atypical episodes in a graph
7Figure 2: Actual and Expected Exchange Rate Depreciation
economic environment, including government announcements and international
and domestic events that may have an impact on depreciation expectations: a
trend during the period of the `Tablita' stabilization plan (which collapsed in
December 1982) to allow for agents internalizing the devaluation announcements
during that period (`Trend Tablita'), level-dummies controlling for the eects of
the sales of foreign exchange guarantees by the \Banco de la Republica" (BROU,
1981m1 1981m10) and those sold by the Central Bank (BCU, 1982m1 1982m3),
the collapse of the Argentinean `Tablita' stabilization plan (`Tablita Argentina',
1982m11 1983m6), the collapse of the Argentinean `Austral' plan (`Austral Col-
lapse', 1986m3   1986m6), the collapse of the Brazilian Cruzado plan (`Cruzado
Collapse', 1986m9 1987m1), the hyperin
ation and banking crisis in Argentina
(`Hyper', 1989m1 1989m12), the dierent announced slopes of the target zones
(`i th Slope'), the depreciation of the Brazilian Real (Real, 1999m1 2002m6),
the collapse of the Argentinean currency board (Argentina, 2002m1   2002m6);
impulse dummies controlling for the eects of the Mexican debt crisis (`Mex-
ican Debt Crisis', 1982m8), the depreciation of the Brazilian Cruzeiro (`Cruzeiro
Depreciation', 1991m1), the Brazilian institutional crisis due to the impeach-
ment of President Collor (Collor, 1992m9), the Tequila crisis in Mexico (Tequila,
1994m12), and the rate of change of the foreign exchange reserves of the Central
Bank.
Secondly, we explore whether a mixed expectation model ts the data better,
plotting depreciation over time (see Figure 2). For sensitivity purposes, dierent thresholds
were chosen and the results were robust to this choice. A alternative method used to capture
possible dierential eects of st on se
t+6, for dierent levels of st was a linear spline of
st. The results were very similar to those reported here, but the goodness of t indicators
favoured the model specied in equation (2).
8by incorporating variables that would capture adaptive and regressive mechan-
isms. The rationale for testing a mixed model from an economic point of view, is
that forecasters may use several models, or there are heterogeneity of forecasters,
with dierent models. Given that we use a proxy for average expectations, we
cannot identify which explanation drives a nding for a mixed model as the two
hypotheses are observationally equivalent.7
To test for a mixed model, we then estimate equation (4):
s
e
t+6 = 0 + 1st + 2Jumpt + 3Jumpt  st + 4ForeErrort + 5(s

t   st)=st +
6CPIt + X
0
t4 + t+6 (4)
where:
(1) ForeErrort is the lagged forecast error, given by (se
t   st)=st. This would
allow for an \adaptive" component in expectations. Here, expectations
about the future spot rate, se
t+1, are formed by placing a weight (1   4)
on the current spot rate, and (4) on the past expected spot (se
t). 8 4 is
usually hypothesized to be between 0 and 1 for expectations to be inelastic.
We will refer to this added variable as re
ecting the \adaptive" component
in expectations.
(2) (s
t  st)=st is a measure of exchange rate disequilibrium. If agents perceive
that the exchange rate will eventually adjust to ensure a stable real exchange
rate, their depreciation expectations will be in
uenced by how far that s
t
that would ensure that real exchange rate stability is from the spot rate
st. Operationally, we dened the \equilibrium" nominal exchange rate s,
as s such that RER =  RER.9. 5 is the speed at which the spot rate
is expected to regress to the \equilibrium" value, and is hypothesized to
be positive. In that case, agents adjust depreciation expectations upwards
when the nominal exchange rate is below the perceived equilibrium value,
s (and vice versa).10 We will refer to this added variable as re
ecting the
\regressive" component on expectations.
(3) CPIt is CPI in
ation over the last six months, pre-determined at period
t. Agents may form expectations about real exchange rates, but not be
sophisticated enough to respond to the disequilibrium as calculated above.
If they face computational costs, they may just look at past in
ation and
expect that its eects on the RER are partially neutralized by a nominal
depreciation. 6 > 0 would suggest that agents revise expectations upwards
after an increase in in
ation.
7Most of the literature tends to estimate dierent models separately. An exception is Prat
and Uctum (1996), who nd evidence supporting a mixed model, using average expectation
data. Another is the work of Benassy-Quere et al. (2003). These authors exploit a panel with
disaggregate expectations data and nd evidence supporting the hypothesis that forecasters are
heterogeneous in the models they use.
8It is possible to see that rearranging, se = 4ForeErrort.
9  RER, the average real exchange rate is calculated over the whole period of analysis, 1980-
2010.
10This follows the logic of Dornbusch (1976) in which variables such as good prices converge to
their long-run values over time. Frankel and Froot (1987) use a similar measure of disequilibrium
to test for regressive expectations.
9Thirdly, given our interest in understanding if the expectation generating
mechanism changed over time, we run separate models for each of the three
sub-periods mentioned, and examine how heterogeneous coecients are across
periods. Given that there are a number of extreme exchange rate movements, and
that these may aect the estimates, we have chosen the beginning and end dates
of the three sub-periods such that the extreme episodes are excluded. This means
that when we estimate (4) for the period Pre-TZ, we exclude the turbulent rst
two years. For TZ, we consider the period 1993m1-2002m5, excluding the collapse
of the TZ regime, while for Post TZ we estimate over the period 2003m1 2010m3,
thus excluding the turbulent second half of 2002.
Data are obtained from the Central Bank of Uruguay. The series used are 7536
for peso deposits and 7538 for dollar deposits. Exchange rate data correspond to
the monthly average of bid prices. Data on foreign exchange reserves is obtained
from the IMF IFS database. Some descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.
4.1 A Note on the Methodology
Here we discuss the methodological problems arising in the estimation of equa-
tion (2), along with the strategy pursued in this paper in an attempt to overcome
them.
4.1.1 Overlapping Observations: Serially Correlated Errors
Because the forecast horizon corresponding to the interest rate dierential is
longer than the observational frequency (monthly), a problem of overlapping ob-
servations arises, which implies that the forecast error t+k follows a non-invertible
moving average process of order k   1.11
This can be showed as follows. Imagine a non-overlapping model, in which,
say the interest dierentials, denoted below as se
t are those for one-month time
deposits, so they capture the expected depreciation over one month only. We
specify the following model:
s
e
t =  + st k + ut (5)
where ut is assumed to be serially uncorrelated, homoscedastic, E(ut) = 0,
V (ut) = 2.
Now, if we look at interest rate dierentials of k-month time deposits, then
the dierential will contain the sum of the depreciation expectations for each of

















11This was rst shown by Hansen and Hodrick (1980).
10Which means that, even if the u's are independent and identically distributed,








V [et] = k
2
u
Cov[et;et+s] = (k   s)
2
u;8k   s > 0 (7)
While OLS estimates of the parameters remain consistent with serial correl-
ation, the standard errors are biased downwards. The standard approach in the
literature is to use a version of GMM introduced by Hansen (1982) to correct the
standard errors. The GMM estimator of the variance-covariance matrix of the
OLS estimates of the regression coecients is:








 is the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals. The element ijth of
that matrix is given by:
^ (i;j) =

^ ui ^ uj if ji   jj  (k   1);
0 ifji   jj > (k   1): (9)
where ^  is the estimated autocovariance. It has been shown that the estimates
of ^ 
 need not be positive denite when samples are small. A solution to this
problem has been suggested by Newey and West (1987), and it has been usually




^ ui ^ uj!i;j if ji   jj  (k   1);
0 ifji   jj > (k   1): (10)
where the choice of !i;j is given by:
!i;j = 1   [ji   jj=(m + 1)] (11)
where m is chosen so that positive deniteness is ensured. Here we follow the
authors' suggestion, and set m = k = 6.
4.1.2 Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity
An additional problem associated to the error term arises if disturbances are
conditionally heteroscedastic. This has been frequently found in monthly nan-
cial data (and it is almost a regularity in higher frequency data). For example, if
large and small errors occur in clusters, then the recent past may provide useful
information about the conditional variance of the errors. While OLS are still un-
biased in the presence of conditionally heteroscedastic errors, eciency gains are
possible by explicitly modeling the pattern of that heteroscedasticity. Following
Engle (1982) and taking our estimable equation (2), that would imply estimat-
ing simultaneously a mean and a variance equation, in which the latter has a
constant, as well as an autoregressive component as specied below:
s
e





t = 0 + 1
2
t 1 + ::: + q
2
t q (12)
11The variance equation specied as above implies that recent disturbances in
u-
ence the variance of the current error. In equation (12), the pattern is described
as an Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) process of order p,
where p is the number of lags that aect the current variance of the error. The
parameters in this model are estimated using Maximum Likelihood techniques
(ML).
In order to test whether ARCH eects are present, we use a Lagrange Multi-
plier test (ARCH LM) that consists in estimating equation (2) using OLS, extract
the estimated errors, and regress their squared values on lags as below:
^ e
2
t = ^ 0 + ^ 1^ e
2
t 1 + ::: + ^ p^ e
2
t p + t (13)
and then test the joint signicance of ^ 1::: ^ p. We tested for ARCH eects in all
the models estimated in this paper, and given that these suggest unambiguously
the presence of conditionally heteroscedastic disturbances (ARCH eects), we
used ARCH models.12
Unfortunately, the Newey-West procedure does not allow for ARCH eects.
Our ad-hoc strategy is to use ARCH models to estimate an augmented version of
equation (2) in which lags of the rst dierences of the dependent and independent
variables are included up to an order of k   1, in an attempt to control for the
moving average process.13
4.1.3 Non-Stationarity & Co-integration
Another consideration involves the time-series properties of the variables un-
der consideration. We performed augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests of unit
roots in both actual depreciation rates and interest rate dierentials, and results
were mixed, depending on the lag length, and on the periods considered (sample
size).14 The inconclusiveness of these unit root tests is not surprising, as it has
been widely acknowledged that they have low power in small samples. For these
reasons, and in order to exclude the possibility of interpreting results from spuri-
ous regressions, we test for cointegration by checking whether residuals from the
estimated long-run relationship contain unit roots. Because in the presence of
non-stationary regressors, the usual t statistics have non-standard distributions,
we use tabulated critical values to perform the cointegration tests. These are
reported after each estimation result.
Although the estimator from the long-run relationship is superconsistent (it
converges to its true value at a faster rate | T | than it would be the case if the
series were stationary), this asymptotic characteristic may be of little use when
working with nite samples. Banerjee et al. (1993) show that large nite-sample
biases can arise in static OLS estimates of co-integrating parameters. A pos-
sible method of reducing nite-sample biases, is estimating a single-equation dy-
namic regression, in the form of an Autoregressive Distributed Lag model (ADL).
For purposes of comparison, we run an ADL in which the lag structure to be
12The results from the ARCH LM tests are reported after each estimation result.
13This idea was kindly suggested by Professor Ron Smith. For verication purposes, we
estimated the same models using the Newey-West procedure and found that the results are
largely unchanged: while standard errors increase, the main coecients of interest remain highly
signicant. Newey-West estimation results for the key coecients are reported in alongside
those obtained using ARCH models.
14These are reported in Table 5.
12modeled is chosen using a set of information criteria indicators (Akaike (AIC),
and Bayesian (BIC)), compute the implied long-run relation and compare it with
that obtained when estimating the static relationship.
The mean equation of the ADL to be estimated can be expressed as in (14):
A(L)s
e
t = 0 + B(L)st + 2Jumpt + 3Jumpt  st + X
0
t4 + t (14)
where A(L) and B(L) are lag polynomials, whose order is determined by the
information criteria mentioned above (both the AIC and BIC suggest 6 lags for
the dependent variable and 2 lags for the explanatory variable). The implied


















where replacing L by 1 in the lag polynomial gives the sum of the coecients in
the polynomial. The cointegration test in the context of an ADL model consists
of testing whether A(1) and B(1) are zero. This is performed and reported in the
section that follows.15
4.2 Results
Results from estimating equation (2) over the whole period are reported in
Column (1) of Table (1). Consider tranquil times rst, when the Jump variable
and the interaction term take a zero value. Our results suggest that agents
extrapolate about 70% of the past exchange rate movement into the future, on
average, and ceteris paribus. This coecient is very well determined and suggests
a strong extrapolative component in the expectation formation mechanism.
The behaviour is subtler in `turbulent' times, after agents observe a jump in
the exchange rate. The estimated eect of lagged depreciation on expectations
should now be calculated as: ^ 1 + ^ 3  Jumpt = 0:222.16 After jumps, agents do
not extrapolate the whole of the past exchange rate movement, but only a smaller
portion. This portion is still sizable, and statistically signicant, as we reject the
hypothesis of 1 =  3 with 95% condence. In addition, after jumps, agents
revise their depreciation expectations upwards, on average, by about 13%, ceteris
paribus. The extrapolative component is less pronounced after crisis periods than
after tranquil periods, although it is still present. In fact, it explains why agents
under-predict large depreciations, but once these have happened, they tend to
over-predict them. To visualize this, look at Figure 2. In Table 4 it is possible
to appreciate that the sample average of expected depreciation during jumps
is 12:7% while the actual equals 92:3%. Instead after the jump has happened,
expected depreciation is on average, 30:8%, while the actual is 13:2%.
While our results support the hypothesis of a strong extrapolative component
in expectation formation, they also suggest that agents are aware of changes in the
economic environment, and internalize their eects on depreciation expectations.
The collapses of Argentinean (Austral) and Brazilian (Cruzado) currency stabil-
ization plans induced increases in depreciation expectations in Uruguay by 1.7%
and 2.4% respectively while the hyperin
ation episode in Argentina induced an
increase in depreciation expectations in Uruguay by 2.1%, on average and ceteris
15See paper 8 in Johnston and DiNardo (1997) for a discussion on ADL models.
16A 95% condence interval for this eect is given by (0.431, 0.013).
13Table 1: Expectation Generating Mechanism Regressions
Dep.Var: i   i (1) Extrap (2) Mixed (3) ADL Extrap
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Lagged Dep 0.705*** (0.003) 0.439*** (0.018) 0.017** (0.007)
Lagged Jump 0.122*** (0.047) 0.204*** (0.024) 0.063*** (0.013)
Inter Lagged Jump*Dep -0.483*** (0.047) -0.484*** (0.039) -0.039** (0.016)
Lagged  CPI 0.317*** (0.016)
L. Fore Error 0.125*** (0.026)
L. Diseq E -0.057*** (0.008)
Trend Tablita 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)
Slope TZ to come -0.005 (0.004) -0.002 (0.003) -0.002* (0.001)
Mexican Debt Crisis -0.000 (0.029) 0.007 (0.036) -0.003 (54552.198)
Tablita Argentina -0.069*** (0.012) 0.132*** (0.025) -0.012** (0.006)
Austral Collapse 0.017* (0.010) 0.017*** (0.003) -0.005** (0.002)
Cruzado Collapse 0.024*** (0.002) -0.004 (0.004) 0.006*** (0.002)
Cruzeiro Depreciation 0.021 (0.881) 0.000 (0.039) -0.001 (0.036)
Forward Contracts BROU -0.003 (0.004) 0.017*** (0.005) -0.008** (0.003)
Forward Contracts BCU -0.018*** (0.006) -0.024*** (0.009) -0.025*** (0.006)
Hyper in Argentina 0.021*** (0.001) 0.011*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.001)
Collor 0.004 (46399.193) 0.024 (179326.571) 0.008 (15330.109)
1st SlopeTZ 0.005*** (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 0.003*** (0.001)
2nd SlopeTZ -0.045*** (0.002) -0.004 (0.003) -0.003* (0.002)
3rd SlopeTZ -0.055*** (0.002) -0.011*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.001)
4th SlopeTZ -0.049*** (0.002) -0.004 (0.002) -0.000 (0.001)
Tequila -0.008 (0.060) 0.025 (344.482) 0.006 (0.006)
Real -0.006*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.003) 0.000 (0.001)
Argentina -0.003 (0.019) 0.026*** (0.005) 0.008*** (0.002)
Var in Forex Reserves 0.008** (0.004) -0.026*** (0.007) -0.009*** (0.003)
Lagged L.Dep. 0.004 (0.007)
L2.L. Dep -0.008 (0.007)
L.Expected Depreciation 1.035*** (0.069)
L2.Expected Depreciation -0.037 (0.098)
L3.Expected Depreciation -0.015 (0.099)
L4.Expected Depreciation -0.026 (0.079)
L5.Expected Depreciation -0.025 (0.073)
L6.Expected Depreciation 0.041 (0.038)
Constant 0.065*** (0.001) 0.030*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.001)
ARCH
Arch 2.061*** (0.218) 1.199*** (0.162) 0.806*** (0.130)
Garch 0.188*** (0.048) 0.447*** (0.060)
Constant 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000* (0.000)
Observations 351 345 351
AIC -1586.258 -1744.099 -2387.480
BIC -1451.131 -1594.200 -2240.770
ADF on Res -6.352 -7.007 -12.977
ARCH LM 128.084 103.344 70.835
Standard errors in parentheses. CV for ADF on Res with 2 non-stationary vars. 3.78 at 1%, 3.25, at 5%, 2.98 at 10%
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
paribus. The hypothesis of agents internalizing the announcements on the slopes
of the TZ is upheld by the data, as the coecients are jointly signicant. The
hypothesis of Slopei = Slopej, i;j 2(1, 4) and i 6= j, is rejected for the pairs (1, 2),
(1, 3), (1, 4) and (2, 3) with 95% condence. It is worth noting that the changes
in the magnitude of the point estimates re
ect the direction of the announced
changes in depreciation rates. The sales of cheap forward contracts by the Central
Bank exerted a negative and statistically signicant eect on expectations, redu-
cing them by 1.8%. On the other hand, the estimated coecients on Mexican
Debt Crisis, the sales of cheap forward contracts by the BROU, the sharp depre-
14ciation of the Cruzeiro, the institutional crisis in Brazil in 1991, the Tequila crisis,
and more surprisingly, the Argentinean crisis of 2001 are not well-determined.17
In Column (3) of Table (1) we report the results of estimating an ADL model,
as described in equation (14). The ADL model was estimated in an attempt to
understand whether the results are aected by explicitly modeling the dynamics.
The implied long-run relation between lagged depreciation and expectations can
be obtained by calculating B(1)=A(1), which yields 0:014=0:027 = 0:52 | which
is in line with the one obtained from the static model (reported in Column 1).
We test for A(1) and B(1) = 0, and reject the null hypothesis at 1% signicance,
which gives further evidence of cointegration.18
Column (2) of Table (1) reports the results of estimating equation (4), in
which adaptive and regressive expectation formation mechanisms are also allowed.
The eect of lagged depreciation on expectations during tranquil times is now
reduced by about 35%. After jumps, while the eect of lagged depreciation
is not statistically signicantly dierent from zero, agents seem to revise their
depreciation expectations upwards, on average, by about 23%, ceteris paribus.
When looking at the coecients on the environmental variables, now the collapse
of the Argentinean Tablita in 1982, the collapse of the Argentinean currency board
in 2001, and the changes in foreign exchange reserves carry the expected signs
and are statistically signicant (positive, positive and negative respectively).
The sign on the estimated coecient on the adaptive component is positive,
implying that the weight placed on the previous prediction is positive, although
much lower than that placed on the current spot rate ( ^ 4 = 0:125). The negative
sign of the estimated coecient on the regressive component is puzzling as it
implies that agents actually expect the exchange rate to diverge away from the
\equilibrium" value. One could argue that the choice of a `wrong equilibrium'
value may determine this nding, although the strong statistical signicance of
the (negative) coecient is discomforting. An alternative explanation is related
to the niteness of the sample size. Agents may expect a convergence to an
equilibrium value in the long run, but may have reasons to expect a divergence
over shorter time periods. The estimated coecient on past CPI in
ation suggests
that agents revise expectations upwards by slightly less than a third of what they
observed in
ation to be in the previous period, on average and ceteris paribus.
The diagnostic tests on these estimated models suggest, rstly, that the mixed
model performs better than the extrapolative model, using the AIC and BIC
information criteria. Secondly, that the stationarity of the estimated residuals
cannot be rejected, which provides evidence of cointegration between the interest
rate dierentials and the depreciation rates. Thirdly, that there is strong evidence
of GARCH eects in the errors. For this reason, the reported estimates were
constructed on the basis of GARCH models. Given that GARCH models do
not allow for a treatment of the non-invertible moving average process present in
the errors due to the overlapping nature of the observations, we re-estimated the
17The coecients for the depreciation trend during the Tablita stabilization plan, the one on
the collapse of the Argentinean `Tablita', the one on the Real Devaluation, and the one on the
rate of change of foreign exchange reserves are well determined but do not yield the expected
sign.
18The test of A(1) = 0 is equivalent to testing the sum of the lagged coecients on the
dependent variable being equal to unity. The prob-value for this test is 0:000. The prob-value
for the test B(1) = 0 is 0:000. We do not report the transformations for all of the covariates,
for the sake of brevity of exposition.
15models using GMM, with the Newey-West adjustment, as described in Section
4.1, and report the results in Table 6. Those results are in line with these reported
here. 19
It could be argued that because we rely on the interest rate dierential as a
measure of depreciation expectations, the observed increase in the interest dier-
ential after extreme exchange rate movements is not fully explained by changes in
depreciation expectations, but also by an increase in the risk-premium required
by the holders of the peso asset. But even if it is a combination of expected
depreciation and risk that is revised upwards after a drastic depreciation, that
behaviour would still be indicative of a backward-looking, extrapolative compon-
ent in the expectation formation mechanism about the variance and about the
mean of the exchange rate.
Our ndings of extrapolative expectations over long horizons may be related
to a perception of uncertainty with respect to the exchange rate exhibited during
much of the 1980s and early 1990s. It has been pointed out by DeGrauwe (1990)
that when the environment is uncertain, rules based on an autoregressive model
become important. This is, probably, because that is all the forecaster has avail-
able. One relevant question is how stable the extent to which agents extrapolate
has been over the period considered. This is a relevant question, given that over
the period considered, dierent regimes have been in place and constitutes the
focus of attention of next section.
4.3 A time-varying extrapolating factor
In this subsection we address RQ3 & RQ4. Firstly, we explore whether the
extent to which agents extrapolate changed across the three dierent periods
considered in this paper: Pre-TZ, TZ and Post-TZ. Secondly, and motivated
by the heterogeneity we nd in the extrapolative component estimated when
looking at the sub periods separately, our contribution consists of identifying a
time-pattern in the degree of extrapolation in expectation formation mechanisms.
To proceed, we estimate equation (4) for the periods Pre-TZ, TZ and Post-
TZ separately. Results are reported in Columns 1-3 of Table 2. A number of
conclusions can be reached by looking at these results.
First, both the Akaike Information Criterium (AIC) and the Bayesian Inform-
ation Criterium (BIC) indicate that estimating the model separately for these
three sub-periods ts the data better than pooling.
Second, the estimated eect of the extrapolative component in the expectation
formation mechanism is always well determined, and it decreases as we move from
the Pre-TZ period to the TZ.
Third, the economic environment variables take the expected sign and are
of reasonable magnitudes in most cases, although they tend to be less well-
determined, probably due to a smaller sample size used to estimate the models
separately for each period. The coecient on the change in foreign exchange re-
serves changes sign from the Pre-TZ to the Post-TZ period. This may be related
19The size of the coecients on the ARCH and GARCH terms suggests non-stationarity in the
variance, as they add to more than one. This suggests that the system is not stable in the way
it absorbs shocks to volatility, which is problematic. We have tried dierent lag structures in
the variance equation, as well as estimated the model using dierent distributional assumptions
for the error term (normal, gaussian and t), but the high coecients persisted.
16to the fact that during the Pre-TZ, Central Bank intervention in the foreign ex-
change market was relatively common (not only through actual foreign exchange
transactions, but also through announcements). Reductions in reserves could
have been perceived as an alert that the Central Bank's ability to prevent the
currency from depreciating was aected, hence the negative estimate. Instead,
the Post-TZ period in which intervention is much less frequent, unsystematic,
and the policymakers' concerns are related to the appreciation of the domestic
currency, and not the converse, increases in the stock of foreign exchange reserves
could be perceived as a signal that the Central Bank is committed to prevent the
the currency from appreciating any further.20 The puzzling result is related to
the coecient on the Real devaluation, which is statistically insignicant. This
variable may be capturing the fact that soon after the devaluation of the Real,
the Central Bank (BCU) reduced the amplitude of the TZ in an attempt to show
commitment to the regime. This could have convinced agents that the BCU was
serious about its commitment to the exchange rate regime, which explains the
negative coecient.
When investigating the sign and size of the estimated coecients on the re-
gressive component of the model, an interesting pattern emerges. While the
estimated coecient is negative for the TZ period, it is positive for the Post-TZ
period. It is reasonable to think that only if exchange rates are allowed to some
extent to 
oat, one could expect that it converges towards an equilibrium value.
If the exchange rate is instead manipulated with other objectives, agents may
reasonably expect it to diverge from that equilibrium value. Our results are in
line with this interpretation, as the estimated coecient for the regressive com-
ponent over the Post-TZ period | when the nominal exchange rate was allowed
to 
oat relatively freely | is positive and signicant, suggesting that agents ex-
pect about 6.5% of the disequilibrium to be corrected per period, on average and
ceteris paribus.
The estimated coecient on the adaptive component is not well-determined
for the Pre-TZ and Post-TZ periods, although it is statistically signicant and
negative during the TZ period.
In terms of the diagnostics, the ADF tests on residuals suggest no unit roots
are present | although for Pre-TZ the rejection is only at the margin. The tests
on ARCH eects on the residuals now suggest no ARCH eects for the periods TZ
and Post-TZ. This is reasonable. Over shorter periods, it is more likely that the
assumption of a constant variance is upheld by the data. Particularly, given that
episode of substantial volatility (the collapse of the target zone regime in 2002)
is left out of the sample, for the reasons argued in Section 4. We still report the
estimates from ARCH models, and replicate the analysis using GMM, reporting
the results in Table 7.21
The results reported above suggest that imposing a constant eect of past
20For example, on the 10th June 2010, the Ministry of Finance announced that they were
going to start intervening in the foreign exchange market to counteract forces towards an
appreciation of the currency. The announcement was followed by a the largest daily increase in
the exchange rate that had happened in the year. The additions to the stock of foreign reserves
of the Central Bank could be seen as a factor that enhances the credibility of the announcement,
inducing expectations of further depreciation. This episode is out of our sample, but it is helpful
to illustrate our point.
21Here again, the estimated coecients on the ARCH processes in the variance equation are
larger than one.
17depreciation on expected depreciation as in equation (4) is restrictive. For this
case study analysed here, given the number of policy changes, allowing for time
variation in the expectation generating mechanism is in order. Surprisingly, the
hypothesis of the same expectation generating mechanism prevailing at any time
of the sample period has generally been implicit in the literature.22 Even if
there is no explicit change in exchange rate policy, it would be reasonable to
think that the true model of exchange rates evolves over time (see, for example,
Kaminsky (1993)) and so, one should expect some evolution of the expectation
formation mechanisms. To our knowledge, the one exception to be found in
the literature is attributable to Prat and Uctum (2007). These authors use a
switching-regression framework with stochastic choice of regime, and look at six
European currencies, to determine if expectation processes change gradually and
smoothly over time. However, little attention seems to be paid to the underlying
causes of the switching process.
We allow the degree of extrapolation to vary non-linearly over time by inter-
acting lagged depreciation with a linear, and a quadratic time trend.23 For these
purposes we estimate the following equation:
s
e




t   st)=st + X
0
t8 + t+k (16)
Then, in order to be able to appreciate the evolution of the extrapolative com-
ponent without imposing any type of functional form to it, we perform rolling
regressions, with a window of 120 observations (10 years), starting at the begin-
ning of our sample period (January 1980). This implies running 247 regressions.
We then extract the estimated coecients of interest as well as their standard er-
rors and plot their evolution over time (and their condence intervals). This will
allow us to assess the validity of the approximation with a quadratic functional
form for the evolution of the extrapolative component.24
Column (4) of Table (2) reports the results of estimating equation (16) over
the whole period. Both the AIC and the BIC reveal substantial improvements
in the t of this model compared to that postulated by equation (4). The mar-
ginal eect of lagged depreciation on expectations during periods of tranquility
is given by 1 + 4  Trend + 5  Trend2. The eect takes an inverted-U shape
during this period, starting from 0.5, and tending to zero at the end of the period.
The analysis suggest that the maximum is found in the period that goes from
1990m3 1993m2. This is consistent with the beginning of the TZ regime (which
started in March 1991 and was publicly announced in June 1992). The point
estimate at the midpoint of the period is 0.58. In line with our previous results,
our estimates suggest that after extreme exchange rate movements, agents revise
expectations upwards by 24%, on average and ceteris paribus, while the eect of
lagged depreciation gets close to zero.25 Although not formally explored here, this
inverted-U shape pattern in the extrapolative component may be indicative of a
22See MacDonald (2000) and Jongen et al. (2008) for reviews on the subject.
23We also experimented with a cubic time trend, but both the AIC and the BIC suggested
that the quadratic performed better.
24Results reported for the rolling regressions correspond to GMM models and not ARCH.
This is because convergence could not be achieved for the majority of the 247 regression models
run.
25At the midpoint of the period, the hypothesis of (1 +4 Trend+5 Trend2) =  3 is
actually rejected with 95% condence. While (1+4Trend+5Trend2) = 0:58, 3 = 0:496
18Table 2: Time-Varying Extrapolating Factor Regressions
Dep.Var: i   i (1) Pre TZ (2) TZ (3) Post-TZ (4) Whole Per. TV
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Lagged Dep 0.354*** (0.041) 0.177*** (0.041) 0.077*** (0.015) -1.496*** (0.119)
Lagged Jump 0.117 (0.100) 0.232*** (0.022)
Inter Lagged Jump*Dep -0.360** (0.180) -0.496*** (0.033)
T.V. Extrapol 0.011*** (0.001)
T.V. Extrapol Sq. -0.000*** (0.000)
Lagged  CPI 0.208*** (0.023) 0.158*** (0.027) 0.313*** (0.024) 0.265*** (0.015)
L. Fore Error -0.062 (0.051) -0.132** (0.062) 0.001 (0.013) -0.016 (0.018)
L.diseq E 0.017 (0.025) -0.023*** (0.009) 0.065*** (0.006) -0.035*** (0.008)
Trend Tablita 0.002*** (0.000)
Mexican Debt Crisis 0.003 (0.041)
Forward Contracts BROU 0.005 (0.005)
Forward Contracts BCU -0.012 (0.008)
Tablita Argentina 0.029 (0.140) 0.095*** (0.015)
Austral Collapse 0.023*** (0.006) 0.040** (0.019)
Cruzado Collapse -0.003 (0.004) 0.013*** (0.003)
Cruzeiro Depreciation 0.011 (0.197) -0.011 (0.032)
Hyper in Argentina 0.015*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.002)
Collor 0.018** (0.008) 0.019 (5096.624)
Var in Forex Reserves -0.032*** (0.007) -0.002 (0.008) 0.020*** (0.006) -0.013** (0.006)
Slope TZ to come -0.002 (0.005) 0.006** (0.002)
1st SlopeTZ 0.064*** (0.005) 0.004** (0.002)
2nd SlopeTZ 0.018*** (0.004) -0.002 (0.003)
3rd SlopeTZ 0.002 (0.003) -0.008** (0.003)
4th SlopeTZ -0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002)
Tequila 0.002 (0.003) 0.021 (4345.545)
Real 0.002 (0.001) 0.004 (0.002)
Argentina 0.052*** (0.005) 0.036*** (0.004)
Constant 0.102*** (0.011) 0.038*** (0.005) -0.004*** (0.001) 0.016*** (0.002)
ARCH
L.arch 1.740*** (0.530) 1.097*** (0.378) 1.883*** (0.521) 1.410*** (0.184)
L.garch 0.310** (0.140) 0.052 (0.038)
Constant 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)
Observations 119 113 81 345
AIC -583.628 -799.586 -577.240 -1854.576
BIC -508.592 -728.674 -534.140 -1696.990
ADF on Res -2.844 -3.550 -6.042 -6.332
ARCH LM 25.544 6.091 4.495 -116.722
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
U shape pattern in the evolution of Central Bank credibility during the Pre-TZ
and TZ periods. The coecients on the economic environment variables exhibit,
generally, the expected signs. The size of the estimated coecients on the slope
announcements during the TZ period are as expected, although now only the
1st and 3rd slope are statistically signicant. The estimated coecient on the
regressive component suggests that agents expect the exchange rate to diverge
away from the equilibrium value, although very slowly (about 1.3% deviation per
period). Instead, past in
ation of 1% induce an increase in depreciation expect-
ations of about 0.26%, on average. The estimated coecient on the adaptive
component is not statistically signicant.
To examine the validity of the quadratic form for the variation over time of
the extrapolative component in expectations, in Figure 3 we plot together inter-
val estimate for the time varying eect of lagged depreciation on expectations,
together with the evolution of the coecients on lagged depreciation, obtained
19from the 247 regressions, when the estimation window of 120 observations was
allowed to roll. A number of conclusions can be drawn from this comparison.
Firstly, that the interval for the quadratic time varying extrapolative component
contains almost all of the relevant coecients from the rolling regressions, and
that the inverted-U shape pattern seems to be common. Secondly, the evolu-
tion of the coecients from the rolling regressions seem to suggest that during
the TZ period, the drop in the weight placed on lagged depreciation to form ex-
pectations about the future is more pronounced than that estimated when the
quadratic functional form is assumed. The reason behind this drop may be re-
lated to the fact that the target zone regime became credible soon after it was
implemented. The quadratic form does not allow a rapid decrease in that com-
ponent. Thirdly, the estimated coecients from the rolling regressions are quite
volatile, particularly those calculated from samples that include the turbulent
period of 2002. Given the small window considered, the extreme movements in
both the dependent and explanatory variables may be very in
uential in the de-
termination of the estimate. Overall, however, the quadratic time varying factor
seems to be a reasonable approximation of how the weight placed on the past
depreciation changed over time.
Figure 3: Time Varying Extrapolation Factor for All Period
5 Predictive Power of the Interest Rate Dier-
entials
Having explored what determines the expectation generating mechanism and
its evolution, we now turn our attention to RQ5 and investigate how well the
interest rate dierential performs as a predictor of the future change in the spot
exchange rate.
205.1 Estimation Strategy
The `traditional vehicle' to test unbiasedness of the interest rate dierential








fc) + t+6 (17)
where st+6 is the ex post future depreciation, dened as (st+6   st)=st and
(i6
dc  ik
fc) is the interest rate dierential corresponding to a six-month deposit in
domestic and foreign currency respectively, actually dened as: [(1 + i6
dc)=(1 +
i6
fc)   1]. The null hypothesis to be tested is  = 1, which implies no systematic
time-varying component of the forecast errors: E(st+k   (ik
dc   ik
fc)) = . This
hypothesis is a joint hypothesis of rational expectations plus no time-varying risk
premium.27
We estimate a model for the period 1980 2010, and then for the sub-periods
corresponding to Pre-TZ, TZ and Post-TZ, as done above. The results are presen-
ted in Table 8. The scatter plots for the whole period, and for each of the sub-
periods are depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Ex-Post Depreciation on Interest Dierential Regression Data
5.2 A Note on the Methodology
5.2.1 Overlapping Observations & ARCH eects
In Section 4.1 we discussed how when the forecast horizon associated with
the interest rate dierentials (six months) is longer than the data periodicity
26This has been widely used in the literature. The most recent example is Frankel and
Poonawala (2010), who use the forward premium instead of interest rate dierentials.
27A second hypothesis that is sometimes tested in the literature jointly with 
1 = 1 is 
0 = 0,
implying no time-invariant bias in the forecast errors. Our focus here is based entirely on 
1.
21(monthly), a problem of overlapping observations arises. The same considera-
tions apply here, and we deal with the problem in the same way. Given the
presence of ARCH eects, in addition to the moving average process of order 5,
we estimate ARCH models including lags of the rst dierences of the dependent
and independent variables.
5.2.2 Problems with the \Traditional Testing Vehicle"
Moore (1994) argued that the traditional approach used in the literature (and
presented in equation (17) above) to test for unbiasedness of the forward premium
as a predictor of the ex post depreciation (or that of the interest rate dierential)
is not generally valid. Its validity relies on a number of restrictive assumptions.
The author's argument, invoking the Granger Representation Theorem, is as
follows. If the spot and forward rate are two non-stationary and cointegrated
variables, then their vector autoregressive representation can be expressed as
an error-correction mechanism (ECM) | the cointegrating vector being  =
(1; 1; 0), and the error correction adjustment parameter vector being  =
(s;f). Two related equations are involved here, as in:













cfiFt i + ft (18)
Long run unbiasedness requires, according to the author, cointegration between
the spot and the forward rate, with the cointegrating vector being  = (1; 1 =
 1; 0 = 0). In turn, short run unbiasedness requires long run unbiasedness,
an ECM adjustment parameter in the spot equation (rst one in (18)) equal to
-1, and no short run dynamics in the spot equation (bsi = csi = 0).
Under short run unbiasedness, the forecast error is white noise. This can be
seen by imposing the condition of short run unbiasedness on the spot equation
of (18). This yields:
(St   Ft 1) = st (19)
Johansen (1992) argues that in the context of a cointegrating system (as the
one outlined in (18)), the estimation of a single equations (as the one of (17))
generates eciency losses unless there is one variable that is weakly exogenous.
That would be implied if only one equation contains an error-correction term.
In the case of interest here, where the dependent variable is St, then, the for-
ward rate must be weakly exogenous (f = 0). If that condition holds, ecient
estimates are obtained, as shown by Johansen, from:






ciFt i + t (20)
The parameters in equation (20) are related to those of the spot equation of
(18) in the following way: b0 = sf
 1
ff , bi = bsi sf
 1
ff bfi, and ci = csi sf
 1
ff cfi
(where ij are the components of the variance covariance matrix of (st;ft). As
22argued by Moore (1994), if the errors in the two equations in (18) are uncorrelated,
so that sf = 0, then (20) is identical to the spot equation of (18).
The author then re-writes (20) as in (21), to better illustrate the number of
restrictions imposed when using the traditional testing vehicle for unbiasedness,
presented in equation (17):







ciFt i + t (21)
Only if b0 = 0, 1 = 1, bi = 0 and ci = 0, estimating (17) would be analogous
to estimating (21). This leads Moore (1994) to conclude that only if:
(1) spot and forward rates are cointegrated,
(2) the forward rate is weakly exogenous, that is to say, the error correction
term in the forward equation is zero, implying that the derivative market
is driving the underlying market,
(3) the long run condition of unbiasedness holds (i.e. 1 = 1),
(4) the cross-equation covariances are zero and
(5) the lag order of the error correction mechanism is exactly equal to one,
then, the traditional testing method of unbiasedness would be valid.
Because these conditions are of empirical nature, we tested each of them
using our dataset for the whole period under consideration, using the Johansen
procedure. This allows us to test for long and short run unbiasedness in the foreign
exchange market in Uruguay, and to assess the validity of testing unbiasedness
using a single equation approach, in the traditional way. Results of this analysis
are discussed in Section 5.3.
Then, in Section 5.4 we discuss the results obtained when using the traditional
testing vehicle, and comment on the compatibility of both approaches.
5.3 The Validity of the Traditional Testing Vehicle
The validity of the traditional approach relies on ve conditions outlined
above. We consider each of them in turn, and use a system estimation approach
to test for long and short run unbiasedness.
Firstly, we choose the lag structure for the vector autoregression represented
by equation (18). This choice was motivated on tests of serial correlation on
the residuals. The null hypothesis of serially uncorrelated residuals cannot be
rejected when a generous structure of 12 lags is chosen. Dierent information
criteria point in the same direction in terms of the lag order (see Tables 12 and
11). This provides the rst piece of evidence casting doubt on the validity of
the traditional approach to test unbiasedness of expectations in the Uruguayan
foreign exchange market.
Secondly, we test for long run unbiasedness. This implies, to begin with,
testing for cointegration between the ex-post spot exchange rate and the expected
exchange rate. We nd evidence of one cointegrating relationship between these
23two series, and this nding is robust to the choice of the lag structure. In fact,
for any lag order between one and twelve, the null hypothesis of the number of
cointegrating vectors being no greater than zero is rejected, while the null of the
number of cointegrating vectors being no greater than one cannot be rejected (see
Table 10). Further to this, we examine the estimated cointegrating vector. The
second part of the long run unbiasedness hypothesis is that 1 = 1 and 0 = 0.
For any lag-length in the interval [1;12], the hypothesis is rejected. However,
1 is, from an economic point of view, very close to unity (see Table 14). This
suggests a substantial kernel of truth for the uncovered interest parity condition
for the case of Uruguay.
Thirdly, we test for weak exogeneity of the expected exchange rate. If the
expected exchange rate is weakly exogenous, that would imply that there is no
signicant rectication of any displacement from long-run equilibrium via changes
in the expected exchange rate. We then tested the hypothesis of the error cor-
rection adjustment parameter in the equation corresponding to the expected ex-
change rate, f = 0. Here again, we test the hypothesis using lag orders in the
interval [1;12] and systematically reject it. In line with previous research done
for dierent currency pairs, such as Moore (1994), and MacDonald and Moore
(2001), we cannot reject the null of s = 0.28 Conceptually, these results suggest
that expectations are not driving the exchange rate movements. Instead, this
would be consistent with a world in which agents have some sort of information
about what is going to happen with the exchange rate, and form expectations
accordingly. For the case of Uruguay over the period considered, this is intuitively
appealing, as the market is relatively thin, and the main actor was the Central
Bank, whose systematic interventions were largely pre-announced. Methodolo-
gically, the rejection of weak exogeneity of the expected exchange rate implies
that eciency losses are incurred when using a single equation approach to test
unbiasedness of expectations.29
To conclude, evidence suggests, rstly, a strong rejection of short-run un-
biasedness | or short run validity of the uncovered interest parity, as dened
by Moore (1994). Secondly, although long-run unbiasedness is also rejected, ^ 1
is from an economic point of view, quite close to unity. Thirdly, that caution
should be placed in the interpretation of results emerging from using the tradi-
tional testing vehicle for unbiasedness.
5.4 The Traditional Testing Vehicle: Results
The results from the analysis of Section 5.3 suggest that equation (17) is
mis-specied. We found it pertinent, however, to proceed and estimate it given
that this approach is so widely used in the literature. Frankel, for example,
considers the single equation procedure to be a parsimonious way of testing a
simple hypothesis.30 Of course, caution should be placed when interpreting the
results.
When estimating (17) we nd that during the period 1980m02   2010m3
there has been a statistically signicant bias in the expectations contained in the
28We can only reject it when the lag order of the VAR is 1, case in which serial correlation
is severe.
29The condition of the cross-equation uncorrelated errors is also violated.
30This was expressed by Jerey Frankel in a personal communication, dated on Nov. 7th,
2010.
24interest rate dierentials, as ^ 
1 < 1 (Column 1 in Table 8). Given the important
extrapolative component in expectations that was found in Section 4, this bias
is not surprising. What is remarkable is that the bias is lower than the general
nding in the literature for developed countries' currencies ( ^ 
1 = 0, and even
negative).31 Our results are in line with the argument of Frankel and Poonawala
(2010) that the bias for emerging economies is lower than that for advanced
economies, as currencies in the former group have more easily identiable trends
of depreciation than those in the latter group. Also, Gilmore and Hayashi (2008)
report ^ 
1 in the range of 0:5 1:5 for Argentinean, Chilean and Brazilian currency
markets, and Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) also nd lower forward premium biases
for emerging economies and argue that the bias is positively correlated with GDP
per capita and negatively with average in
ation and in
ation volatility.
We then investigated whether these ndings are stable across the sub-periods
dened in Section 4. Column 2 reports results for the Pre-TZ regime (1980  
1992). Surprisingly, the results imply that expectations move in the opposite
direction to actual spot rates. However, a closer look at the scatter plot for this
sub-period (top-right panel of Figure 4) suggests that the nding is driven by the
large depreciation of the peso in 1982. We exclude the extreme event of 1982, and
re-estimate equation (17) for the Pre-TZ period starting in 1983 (Column 3). The
rationale for this adjustment is as follows: our sample period starts with a drastic
exchange rate movement. It is likely that the internalization of this drastic event
has happened earlier, out of our sample, which induces a small-sample bias. This
can be thought of as the other side of the coin of the `peso problem'. Our small
sample includes the jump but not the whole of the gradual expectation adjustment
that is likely to have taken place before the actual depreciation. After adjusting
the sub-period to start in 1983, (Pre   TZ), we nd a strong co-movement of
expectations and spot rates, although the bias in the prediction of the interest
rate dierential is still statistically signicant. Results for the TZ period point to
the same direction (Column 4). The period Post-TZ, characterized by a 
oating
exchange rate regime, reveals a dierent pattern: no signicant co-movement is
found between expectations and spot rates.32 These results raise a number of
issues.
First, the bias of the interest rate dierential as a predictor of exchange rate
movements is smaller when looking at the whole sample period, than when looking
at a set of sub-periods, separately. This is likely to be related to the `peso
problem'. A bias due to the small-sample used arises if interest rate dierentials
contain information on a small probability of a big change in the exchange rate
that happens out of sample. As argued by Flood and Rose (1996), a suciently
large sample, with a representative number of actual drastic depreciation will
attenuate this bias.33
Second, the fact that the bias seems to be larger in the Post-TZ than in
31For a survey of the original literature, see Hodrick (1987) and Engel (1996).
32We also estimated equation (17) using the Newey-West procedure. Newey-West results are
in line with those reported here, and the 
1 coecient is always highly signicant, with the
exception of the one estimated for Post-TZ. It is worth mentioning that because using Newey-
West the standard errors are larger, now the 95% condence interval estimates for 
1, for the
whole period, and the sub-periods Pre-TZ and TZ contain 1. This implies that the null of
unbiasedness cannot be rejected.
33Of course, there is no guarantee that the 15 drastic movements that we have in our sample
are enough to make our sample `large'.
25the Pre-TZ period oers some evidence that the drivers of these results are not
related to unidentied time-varying risk premia, but instead are associated with
expectational failures. This is because if the risk premium is associated with
exchange rate volatility, then, given the record of exchange rate volatility one
would expect the risk premium to have been (a) higher, and (b) more volatile
during Pre-TZ than Post-TZ. However, the bias is found to be smaller during
Pre-TZ than during Post-TZ.
Third, the poor performance of the interest rate dierential over the Post-
TZ period could be attributed to the fact that with a regime in which there are
no announcements from the Central Bank, and in the context of low in
ation,
predicting exchange rate movements becomes more dicult than during Pre-
TZ and TZ. It is worth mentioning that this period is characterised by non-
systematic interventions of the Central Bank in the foreign exchange market,
and erratic messages from both its board of directors and the government, in
terms of exchange rate policy. This introduces uncertainty with respect to the
underlying model determining the exchange rate and makes it more complex to
predict. One could argue that, of the three sub-periods considered, this one is the
one in which the resemblance to a developed currency market is the highest, and
so is the nding: the interest rate dierential does not predict depreciation at
all. It ts the `forward premium puzzle'.34 This is in line with previous ndings.
For example Flood and Taylor (1996), Huisman et al. (1998), Lothian and Wu
(2005) and Huisman and Mahieu (2006) nd that the larger the interest rate
dierentials are, the better their predictive power. As argued by (MacDonald,
2007, p. 387), in contexts of low in
ation, interest rates re
ect liquidity eects,
while in environments of high in
ation, they will re
ect Fisher eects. So, the
regression of depreciation on interest rate dierentials will show a correctly signed
association for the high in
ation environment, but a wrongly signed one for the
low in
ation environment.
An additional explanation related to the `peso problem' can be found through
a close examination of the scatter of ex-post depreciation and the expectations
contained in the interest rate dierential, reported in the bottom-right panel of
Figure 4. Expectations have been predominantly biased upwards. While the
interest rate dierentials have been systematically positive, actual depreciation
alternated between positive (30 periods) and negative (56 periods). Given the
history of exchange rate movements in Uruguay, it seems reasonable to attribute
a portion of that bias to a perennial discount in the peso, as agents have the
perception of a small probability of a large peso depreciation.35
34This is further evidence that is in line with Frankel and Poonawala (2010). They argue
that the bias is larger for developed countries' currencies, and reach this nding by exploiting
their panel structure. An analogy can be drawn here. Exploiting the time series structure of
our data, we nd the bias to be largest when the market most resembles one of a developed
economy.
35For all periods, the null of no ARCH eects in the residuals is overwhelmingly rejected by
the data for all specications.
26Table 3: Ex-Post Depreciation on Interest Rate Dierentials Regressions
(1) All Period (2) Pre-TZ (3) Pre-TZ* (4) TZ (5) Post-TZ
D.V. Actual Dep. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Expected Dep. 0.748*** (0.008) -0.132*** (0.032) 0.723*** (0.032) 0.634*** (0.032) 0.011 (0.285)
Constant 0.004*** (0.001) 0.286*** (0.008) 0.081*** (0.008) 0.019*** (0.003) -0.026*** (0.010)
ARCH
L.arch 2.675*** (0.065) 1.892*** (0.168) 1.596*** (0.266) 1.194*** (0.241) 0.713 (0.446)
Constant 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)
Observations 357 156 120 120 81
AIC -971.122 -292.497 -359.173 -525.847 -213.692
BIC -955.611 -280.298 -348.023 -514.697 -204.114
Arch LM Test 254.2 116.6 65.9 74.9 62.9
ADF on Residuals -6.672 -4.504 -4.726 -3.041 -3.601
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01, CV for ADF on Res with 2 non-stationary vars. 3.78 at 1%, 3.25, at 5%, 2.98 at 10%
Standard errors in parentheses. C.V. for the Arch LM Test: 3.84.
6 Conclusions
This paper adds to the literature on exchange rate expectation generating
mechanisms and the uncovered interest parity testing. The empirical departures
from the uncovered interest parity are well-known in the literature, which has
mostly focused on developed economies. These departures, in turn, have brought
about research on the drivers of expectation generating mechanisms but tend to
have ignored that these mechanisms may change over time.
This paper draws upon the Uruguayan case over the period 1980-2010. The
Uruguayan case is interesting because during the period it exhibited two distinct-
ive features of emerging economies: a movement from high to low in
ation levels,
and changes in exchange rate policies. Both features are likely to have a direct
bearing on exchange rate expectations formation, and on the correlation between
exchange rate changes and the interest rate dierentials.
First, this paper explores how much weight agents placed on the past beha-
viour of exchange rates to form expectations, and what determines that weight.
Our contribution is motivated from the conjecture that economic conditions re-
lated to exchange rate determination and the degree of inertia in the economy
changed signicantly during the period. In line with this, we reveal that the ex-
trapolative component associated with expectations changes over time. The iden-
tied evolution of the extrapolative component in expectation formation, jointly
with our nding that agents internalize in their expectations policy announce-
ments and external events that may aect exchange rate fundamentals, points to
some degree of rationality and smooth adaptation to dierent environments.
We also nd, using alternative testing frameworks, that there have been stat-
istically signicant departures from the uncovered interest parity over the period.
Overall, the prediction bias for the case of Uruguay is signicantly lower than that
found for developed economies. However, the result is not homogeneous across
periods. During Pre-TZ and TZ periods, the prediction of the interest rate dier-
ential performs quite well, during the period characterized by a relatively freely

oating exchange rate regime | or at least, lack of announcements about target
values for the exchange rate | and low in
ation, the interest rate dierential has
no predictive power over the exchange rate movements.
In light of our ndings on the drivers of expectations mechanisms, we can
claim that as long as what it takes to predict well is rather simple | i.e. look
27backwards, follow policy announcements, the interest rate dierential performs
well. However, once the exchange rate determination model becomes intricate, or
at least unfamiliar | regimes in which the Central Bank does not pre-announce
a target for the exchange rate have not been frequent in Uruguay| agents fail
in their attempt to accurately predict exchange rate depreciations. The `forward
premium puzzle' does not seem so puzzling in this case.
Although the focus of this paper is on the Uruguayan economy and this might
raise some doubts on the external validity of the results, it oers some interesting
insights on the process of adaptation of expectation generating mechanisms, and
its implications on agents' forecasting ability across dierent environments.
However, a few caveats are in order. First, we use interest rate dierentials
as an indirect measure of expectations. Within those dierentials there is a
risk-premium. We have argued above why these results are not likely to be
driven by the risk premium, though strictly, we would need to use survey data on
exchange rate expectations, which unfortunately are not available for Uruguay
over the period of analysis. Second, we have not found a way of simultaneously
treating the ARCH eects and the non-invertible moving average process in the
residuals. The ad-hoc approach used attempted to do so, although this has not
proved to be entirely satisfactory. On the one hand, we obtain ARCH estimates
exceeding unity in some cases, which violates the stationarity condition for the
conditional variance. This is suggesting that the processes are not stable in how
they absorb shocks to volatility. On the other hand, there is still some evidence
of serial correlation, which led us to re-estimate all models using the Newey-West
correction procedures. The results found are in line with those obtained using
ARCH models (Newey-West estimates of the key coecients estimated here also
reported here). Finally, it is worth noting that both ARCH models and Newey-
West procedures rely on asymptotic properties, while our sample size is relatively
modest. For these reasons, the reported estimates of the standard errors should
be interpreted with some caution.
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30Table 4: Descriptive Statistics on Main Variables
All Period
Depreciation Expected Depreciation CPI In
ation
Mean 15.5% 14.6% 16.4%
Std. Dev. 22.0% 11.1% 13.6%
95th Perc.. 44.7% 33.7% 38.9%
Pre-TZ
Mean 27.9% 24.1% 28.5%
Std. Dev. 24.3% 6.9% 11.1%
95th Perc. 53.6% 35.8% 50.5%
TZ
Mean 11.7% 9.2% 10.1%
Std. Dev. 14.3% 5.2% 8.0%
95th Perc. 52.7% 16.7% 23.6%
Post-TZ
Mean -1.8% 5.1% 4.7%
Std. Dev. 8.4% 9.7% 3.7%
95th Perc.. 17.3% 25.1% 17.1%
Tranquil Periods
Mean 12.2% 14.7% 16.9%
Std. Dev. 13.1% 11.3% 13.7%
95th Perc. 36.4% 33.8% 39.1%
During Jumps
Mean 92.3% 12.7% 8.8%
Std. Dev. 38.6% 8.0% 10.0%
95th Perc. 150.3% 23.4% 32.1%
After Jumps
Mean 13.2% 30.8% 24.1%
Std. Dev. 8.5% 9.1% 7.9%
95th Perc. 26.8% 53.5% 36.7%
Notes: Variables are measured over a 6-month period.
Figure 5: Coecients of Adaptive and Regressive Components - Rolling Regres-
sions
31Table 5: Unit Root Tests on Main Variables
Actual Depreciation
Period Trend Lags Test Stat CV 1% CV 5% CV 10%
All No 1 -5.418 -3.452 -2.876 -2.57
All No 3 -5.555 -3.452 -2.876 -2.57
All No 6 -2.968 -3.452 -2.876 -2.57
All No 12 -2.463 -3.452 -2.876 -2.57
All Yes 1 -6.54 -3.986 -3.426 -3.13
All Yes 3 -6.95 -3.986 -3.426 -3.13
All Yes 6 -4.278 -3.986 -3.426 -3.13
Pre TZ Yes 3 -4.788 -4.023 -3.443 -3.143
Pre TZ Yes 6 -2.854 -4.024 -3.443 -3.143
Pre TZ Yes 12 -2.736 -4.026 -3.444 -3.144
TZ Yes 1 -2.706 -4.035 -3.448 -3.148
TZ Yes 3 1.046 -4.035 -3.448 -3.148
TZ Yes 6 0.281 -4.035 -3.448 -3.148
TZ Yes 12 1.716 -4.035 -3.448 -3.148
Post TZ Yes 1 -3.279 -4.071 -3.464 -3.158
Post TZ Yes 3 -2.85 -4.071 -3.464 -3.158
Post TZ Yes 6 -2.215 -4.071 -3.464 -3.158
Post TZ Yes 12 -2.034 -4.071 -3.464 -3.158
Interest Rate Dierential
Period Trend Lags Test Stat CV 1% CV 5% CV 10%
All No 1 -1.641 -3.451 -2.876 -2.57
All No 3 -1.686 -3.451 -2.876 -2.57
All No 6 -1.711 -3.452 -2.876 -2.57
All No 12 -1.523 -3.452 -2.876 -2.57
All Yes 1 -2.724 -3.986 -3.426 -3.13
All Yes 3 -2.828 -3.986 -3.426 -3.13
All Yes 6 -2.91 -3.986 -3.426 -3.13
All Yes 12 -2.912 -3.986 -3.426 -3.13
Pre TZ Yes 1 -1.431 -4.022 -3.443 -3.143
Pre TZ Yes 3 -1.581 -4.023 -3.443 -3.143
Pre TZ Yes 6 -0.877 -4.024 -3.443 -3.143
Pre TZ Yes 12 -0.892 -4.026 -3.444 -3.144
TZ Yes 1 3.782 -4.035 -3.448 -3.148
TZ Yes 3 3.456 -4.035 -3.448 -3.148
TZ Yes 6 2.765 -4.035 -3.448 -3.148
TZ Yes 12 2.773 -4.035 -3.448 -3.148
Post TZ Yes 1 -2.08 -4.058 -3.458 -3.155
Post TZ Yes 3 -2.168 -4.058 -3.458 -3.155
Post TZ Yes 6 -2.425 -4.058 -3.458 -3.155
Post TZ Yes 12 -2.522 -4.058 -3.458 -3.155
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results Displayed Above. CV stands for Critical Value
32Table 6: Newey-West: Expectation Generating Mechanism Regressions
Dep.Var: i   i (1) Extrap (2) MILERA (3) ADL Extrap
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Lagged Dep 0.704*** (0.030) 0.454*** (0.040) 0.102*** (0.020)
Lagged Jump 0.257*** (0.046) 0.201*** (0.037) -0.005 (0.021)
Inter Lagged Jump*Dep -0.620*** (0.057) -0.367*** (0.057) -0.019 (0.031)
Trend Tablita 0.001** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.001*** (0.000)
Slope TZ to come 0.028 (0.019) 0.008 (0.014) -0.004 (0.006)
Mexican Debt Crisis 0.002 (0.034) 0.013 (0.029) -0.003 (0.020)
Tablita Argentina -0.021 (0.028) 0.006 (0.023) -0.059*** (0.015)
Austral Collapse 0.043 (0.028) 0.009 (0.020) 0.000 (0.010)
Cruzado Collapse 0.032 (0.027) -0.003 (0.019) 0.010 (0.009)
Cruzeiro Depreciation 0.053 (0.039) -0.005 (0.030) 0.006 (0.019)
Forward Contracts BROU -0.005 (0.022) -0.003 (0.016) -0.010 (0.007)
Forward Contracts BCU -0.012 (0.031) -0.020 (0.023) -0.022* (0.013)
Hyper in Argentina 0.041** (0.020) 0.021 (0.014) 0.013** (0.006)
Collor -0.036 (0.037) -0.012 (0.031) 0.003 (0.020)
1st SlopeTZ 0.012 (0.012) 0.021** (0.010) 0.002 (0.003)
2nd SlopeTZ -0.031* (0.019) 0.011 (0.014) -0.007 (0.005)
3rd SlopeTZ -0.039** (0.020) 0.006 (0.015) -0.007 (0.006)
4th SlopeTZ -0.022 (0.017) 0.006 (0.012) -0.005 (0.005)
Tequila 0.011 (0.038) 0.023 (0.030) 0.013 (0.019)
Real -0.022 (0.017) 0.015 (0.013) -0.000 (0.005)
Argentina -0.009 (0.029) 0.036* (0.021) 0.015 (0.009)
Var in Forex Reserves 0.028* (0.016) 0.016 (0.014) -0.007 (0.009)
Lagged  CPI 0.249*** (0.043)
L. Fore Error 0.130*** (0.043)
L. Diseq E -0.122*** (0.027)
L. Actual Dev 0.060*** (0.018)
L2. Actual Dev -0.038*** (0.013)
L.Expected Depreciation 0.712*** (0.053)
L2.Expected Depreciation 0.314*** (0.067)
L3.Expected Depreciation -0.424*** (0.065)
L4.Expected Depreciation 0.161** (0.066)
L5.Expected Depreciation 0.233*** (0.063)
L6.Expected Depreciation -0.164*** (0.049)
Constant 0.050*** (0.007) 0.031*** (0.006) 0.006*** (0.002)
Observations 351 345 351
AIC -1218.887 -1357.233 -1720.353
BIC -1091.481 -1218.866 -1585.226
ADF on Res -6.275 -7.773 -13.025
Standard errors in parentheses. CV for ADF on Res with 2 non-stationary vars. 3.78 at 1%, 3.25, at 5%, 2.98 at 10%
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
33Table 7: Newey-West Time-Varying Extrapolating Factor Regressions
Dep.Var: i   i (1) Pre TZ (2) TZ (3) Post-TZ (4) Whole Per. TV
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Lagged Dep 0.426*** (0.061) 0.253*** (0.053) 0.137*** (0.041) -2.134*** (0.326)
Lagged Jump 0.178*** (0.044) 0.133*** (0.036)
Inter Lagged Jump*Dep -0.459*** (0.081) -0.280*** (0.056)
Lagged  CPI 0.211*** (0.039) 0.220*** (0.053) 0.436*** (0.110) 0.107** (0.043)
L. Fore Error 0.103 (0.085) 0.041 (0.089) 0.081** (0.033) 0.043 (0.039)
L. Diseq E -0.097 (0.067) -0.037 (0.023) 0.003 (0.015) -0.122*** (0.024)
Slope TZ to come 0.003 (0.011) -0.006 (0.012)
Tablita Argentina 0.105** (0.044) 0.033 (0.021)
Austral Collapse 0.009 (0.015) 0.029 (0.018)
Cruzado Collapse -0.010 (0.014) 0.015 (0.017)
Cruzeiro Depreciation -0.015 (0.020) -0.013 (0.026)
Hyper in Argentina 0.013 (0.010) 0.006 (0.012)
Collor 0.008 (0.022) -0.030 (0.026)
Var in Forex Reserves -0.028** (0.014) -0.018 (0.012) 0.015 (0.016) 0.030** (0.012)
1st SlopeTZ 0.041*** (0.009) 0.016* (0.009)
2nd SlopeTZ 0.018** (0.007) -0.005 (0.013)
3rd SlopeTZ 0.000 (0.006) -0.004 (0.013)
4th SlopeTZ -0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.011)
Tequila 0.008 (0.008) 0.017 (0.026)
Real -0.002 (0.003) 0.011 (0.011)
Argentina 0.032*** (0.006) 0.028 (0.018)
T.V. Extrapol 0.014*** (0.002)
T.V. Extrapol Sq. -0.000*** (0.000)
Trend Tablita 0.004*** (0.001)
Mexican Debt Crisis 0.014 (0.025)
Forward Contracts BROU 0.021 (0.014)
Forward Contracts BCU -0.005 (0.020)
Constant 0.063*** (0.019) 0.038*** (0.010) -0.003 (0.004) 0.035*** (0.005)
Observations 119 113 81 345
AIC -539.131 -760.972 -501.504 -1456.860
BIC -469.653 -698.242 -463.193 -1310.805
ADF on Res -4.956 -4.229 -3.969 -7.707
Standard errors in parentheses
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table 10: Trace Test for Cointegration Rank
Lags VECM Max Rank Parms LL Trace Stat Crit. Val.
1 0 2 -695.230 70.288 15.41
1 5 -660.387 0.600 3.76
2 0 6 -596.810 86.031 15.41
1 9 -554.259 0.929 3.76
3 0 10 -582.578 88.932 15.41
1 13 -538.377 0.531 3.76
4 0 14 -571.298 98.650 15.41
1 17 -522.299 0.653 3.76
5 0 18 -553.729 156.965 15.41
1 21 -475.517 0.541 3.76
6 0 22 -486.736 102.931 15.41
1 25 -435.586 0.631 3.76
7 0 26 -357.183 36.983 15.41
1 29 -339.183 0.984 3.76
8 0 30 -293.360 68.535 15.41
1 33 -259.721 1.257 3.76
9 0 34 -262.241 38.650 15.41
1 37 -243.558 1.285 3.76
10 0 38 -255.553 51.058 15.41
1 41 -230.593 1.138 3.76
11 0 42 -251.784 50.062 15.41
1 45 -227.256 1.007 3.76
12 0 46 -232.636 53.187 15.41
1 49 -206.392 0.699 3.76
Table 11: Information Criteria for Determination of Lag Order
Lags LL LR df P-Value FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 -2024.57 433.758 11.748 11.757 11.771
1 -650.429 2748.3 4 0.000 0.154 3.805 3.832 3.872
2 -547.997 204.86 4 0.000 0.087 3.235 3.279 3.346
3 -533.26 29.474 4 0.000 0.082 3.173 3.235 3.328
4 -518.003 30.514 4 0.000 0.077 3.107 3.187 3.308
5 -472.683 90.64 4 0.000 0.060 2.868 2.965 3.113
6 -433.741 77.884 4 0.000 0.049 2.665 2.781 2.955
7 -338.787 189.91 4 0.000 0.029 2.138 2.271 2.472
8 -260.073 157.43 4 0.000 0.019 1.705 1.856 2.084
9 -243.79 32.567 4 0.000 0.018 1.634 1.802 2.057
10 -230.681 26.218 4 0.000 0.017 1.581 1.767 2.049
11 -227.09 7.1828 4 0.127 0.017 1.583 1.787 2.096
12 -206.043 42.095 4 0.000 0.015 1.484 1.706 2.041
37Table 12: Serial Correlation Criteria for Determination of Lag Order
Lags VECM Lags in Test Chi2 DofF P-Value
1 1 30.465 4 0.000
2 39.370 4 0.000
3 37.625 4 0.000
4 102.124 4 0.000
5 35.234 4 0.000
2 1 30.147 4 0.000
2 19.091 4 0.001
3 63.395 4 0.000
4 107.869 4 0.000
5 15.979 4 0.003
3 1 30.400 4 0.000
2 39.331 4 0.000
3 37.638 4 0.000
4 102.043 4 0.000
5 35.260 4 0.000
4 1 89.437 4 0
2 20.619 4 0.0004
3 52.458 4 0.000
4 133.492 4 0.000
5 20.521 4 0.0004
5 1 75.836 4 0.000
2 177.733 4 0.000
3 130.787 4 0.000
4 33.967 4 0.000
5 63.294 4 0.000
6 1 183.944 4 0.000
2 261.372 4 0.000
3 84.496 4 0.000
4 15.404 4 0.004
5 32.493 4 0.000
7 1 150.680 4 0.000
2 7.206 4 0.125
3 31.019 4 0.000
4 30.407 4 0.000
5 66.865 4 0.000
8 1 31.097 4 0.000
2 46.080 4 0.000
3 10.355 4 0.035
4 6.382 4 0.172
5 23.969 4 0.000
9 1 24.844 4 0.000
2 17.122 4 0.002
3 9.032 4 0.060
4 10.190 4 0.037
5 26.617 4 0.000
10 1 6.874 4 0.143
2 16.972 4 0.002
3 13.662 4 0.008
4 11.764 4 0.019
5 7.297 4 0.121
11 1 39.197 4 0.000
2 7.851 4 0.097
3 14.444 4 0.006
4 19.421 4 0.001
5 7.222 4 0.125
12 1 15.264 4 0.004
2 5.401 4 0.249
3 6.798 4 0.147
4 6.463 4 0.167
5 2.188 4 0.701
38Table 13: Weak Exogeneity Tests
Lags Equation Coecient S.E. t-stat P-Value Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 Forward Eq -0.162 0.021 -7.77 0 -0.202 -0.121
Spot Eq. -0.049 0.012 -4.08 0 -0.073 -0.026
2 Forward Eq -0.193 0.020 -9.74 0 -0.232 -0.154
Spot Eq. -0.002 0.012 -0.17 0.864 -0.025 0.021
3 Forward Eq -0.220 0.022 -9.92 0 -0.263 -0.176
Spot Eq. -0.0003 0.013 -0.02 0.983 -0.025 0.025
4 Forward Eq -0.254 0.024 -10.5 0 -0.301 -0.207
Spot Eq. -0.001 0.015 -0.07 0.947 -0.029 0.028
5 Forward Eq -0.342 0.025 -13.49 0 -0.392 -0.292
Spot Eq. 0.033 0.016 2.06 0.04 0.002 0.065
6 Forward Eq -0.292 0.029 -10.23 0 -0.348 -0.236
Spot Eq. 0.046 0.020 2.26 0.024 0.006 0.086
7 Forward Eq -0.142 0.025 -5.62 0 -0.191 -0.092
Spot Eq. 0.034 0.024 1.46 0.145 -0.012 0.081
8 Forward Eq -0.163 0.021 -7.64 0 -0.205 -0.121
Spot Eq. 0.042 0.024 1.74 0.082 -0.005 0.090
9 Forward Eq -0.129 0.023 -5.59 0 -0.174 -0.083
Spot Eq. 0.027 0.027 0.98 0.328 -0.027 0.080
10 Forward Eq -0.163 0.024 -6.92 0 -0.209 -0.117
Spot Eq. 0.001 0.028 0.04 0.97 -0.054 0.056
11 Forward Eq -0.167 0.025 -6.58 0 -0.217 -0.118
Spot Eq. 0.026 0.030 0.87 0.384 -0.033 0.086
12 Forward Eq -0.181 0.026 -6.96 0 -0.232 -0.130
Spot Eq. 0.017 0.033 0.52 0.6 -0.047 0.081
Table 14: Cointegration Coecient
Lags in VECM Coe. S.E. t-stat P-Value Upper Bound Lower Bound
1 0.944 0.021 45.100 0.000 0.985 0.903
2 0.947 0.017 55.310 0.000 0.981 0.914
3 0.946 0.015 63.330 0.000 0.975 0.917
4 0.943 0.012 75.650 0.000 0.968 0.919
5 0.944 0.008 114.120 0.000 0.961 0.928
6 0.948 0.009 110.140 0.000 0.965 0.931
7 0.956 0.013 71.180 0.000 0.982 0.930
8 0.965 0.009 102.170 0.000 0.984 0.947
9 0.962 0.012 81.460 0.000 0.985 0.939
10 0.964 0.010 98.970 0.000 0.983 0.945
11 0.963 0.009 104.360 0.000 0.981 0.945
12 0.959 0.008 115.580 0.000 0.975 0.943
39